Research on International Carbon Emissions Trading and Optimal Exports Scale of China Carbon Emissions  by Zhanga, Yun
 Procedia Environmental Sciences  10 ( 2011 )  101 – 107 
doi: 10.1016/j.proenv.2011.09.018 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
2011 3rd International Conference on Environmental Science and Information 
Application Technology 
Research on International Carbon Emissions Trading and 
Optimal Exports Scale of China Carbon Emissions 
Yun Zhanga*
Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce, Wenxiang Road 2800, Songjiang District, 201620, Shanghai, China 
Abstract 
This paper reviews the researches related to international carbon emission right trading. Based on the analysis of 
marginal abatement curves theory, it has been demonstrated that the fact that different countries or districts have 
different marginal abatement costs of carbon emission upon respective abatement promise gives rise to international 
carbon emission right trading. Furthermore, this paper proposes that developing countries should actively participate 
in the international carbon emission right trading in order to obtain due market benefits. Then, on the basis of the 
two-phase model, this essay also discusses the optimal exports scale of carbon emission right and its determinant 
factors, and evaluates the optimal export quantity of carbon emission right for China at the first phase. 
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1. Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol signed in December 1997 established a flexible abatement mechanism, in order to 
facilitate the international carbon emission right trading to become a rapidly emerging market. However, 
the leading power, especially the pricing power is mainly in the hand of developed countries listed in 
Annex B Nation, which could reduce the price of international carbon emission right to an extremely low 
level by transferring carbon emission right through import and export transactions (i.e. carbon emission 
right transfer implicit in trading) or by taking advantage of information asymmetry, or the power to 
formulate international rules. Although over the recent years, China has played an active role in dealing 
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with climatic change, in enhancing energy saving and emission reduction, as well as in international 
carbon emission trading market and the export of carbon emission right, China is now facing more and 
more international pressure on emission reduction. 
2. Relevant Researches 
Along with the increasing global attention on the climate problems,  more and more researches on the 
carbon emission right trading have been conducted. W.J. Baumo & W.E. Oates(1971),T. Tietenberg & L. 
Lewis(1985), Jacoby and Ellerman(2002), Burtraw(2009) et al. were mainly concerned with the 
desirability of carbon emission right trading, and the majority of them supported the idea that government 
should guide private decisions through market behaviours instead of direct intervention. R. T. Sterner
˄2002˅, Klepper G. & S. Peterson˄2004˅, compared the application scopes and pros &cons of 
carbon emission right trading with those of other environmental policy tools from the perspectives of 
economic costs, static and dynamic efficiency, and the political practicability, etc. Stavins R.N˄1995˅,
Cason˄1995,1996˅ , Dewees D.˄2001˅ , R. A. Muller & S. Mestelman˄2002˅ , C. Fischer 
˄2003˅ , and N. J. Buckley˄2003ˈ2004˅et al. investigated the institutional design of carbon 
emission right trading and its efficiency. After the Copenhagen Conference of December 2009, a large 
number of scholars in China began to focus on the issue of carbon emission right, such as Jin Yunhui & 
lIU Xue (2000), Zeng Gang & Wan Zhihong (2009), Yang Ji(2010), Zhao Liming & Zhang Han(2010), 
Fu Qiang & Li Tao(2010), and Shi Yadong & Zhong Maochu(2010) et al. The existing studies are mainly 
concerned with carbon emission right trading market between corporations in one country or one district, 
with their starting point  concentrated on the fulfillment of carbon emission abatement by developed 
countries, without looking into carbon emission right trading on the global market level, What is 
especially lacking is the discussion on the development of international carbon emission market from the 
standpoint of developing countries. 
3. Analysis of International Carbon Emission Right Trading From the Perspective of Cost  
3.1 Marginal Abatement Cost Curves 
Marginal Abatement Curves (MACCs) can be obtained from MIT’s Emission Prediction and Policy 
Analysis (EPPA) model. The EPPA model divide the globe into the following 12 districts: USA, 
Japan(JPN), European Economic Community (EEC), other OECD countries(OOE), Eastern Europe(EET), 
Former Soviet Union Countries(FSU), Energy Export Countries(EEX), China(CHN), India(IND), 
Dynamic Asian Economies (DAE), Brazil(BRA), and other countries of the world(ROW). Among the 
above 12 districts, the first six belongs to the Annex B countriesˈin which Tokyo Protocol clearly 
provides for the abatement promise of the Annex B countries in the first phase (2008-2012), and the rest 
of the six countries are Non-Annex B Countries. 
The marginal abatement cost function could be calculated through regressive analysis using EPPA 
model, with its expression: MCP = tt bQaQ +=
2 , where tQ  denotes the abatement quantity with the 
period T(Mton), and MC represents the marginal abatement cost(USD). Ellerma & Decaux˄1998˅
applied EPPA model to evaluate the marginal abatement cost function of the 12 districts in 2010, and the 
resulting coefficients are shown in Table 1. All the equations showed a high degree of fitting, all the value 
of 2R  being larger than 0.99.   
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Table1. Regressive Analysis of Every District’ s Marginal Abatement Cost Function ˄Unit˖USDǃMton˅
District Coefficient a Coefficient b 2R District Coefficient a Coefficient b 2R
USA 0.0005 0.0398 0.9923 EEX 0.0032 0.3029 0.9983 
JPN 0.0155 1.8160 0.9938 CHN 0.00007 0.0239 0.9992 
EEC 0.0024 0.1503 0.9951 IND 0.0015 0.0787 0.9970 
OOE 0.0085 -0.0986 0.9981 DAE 0.0047 0.3774 0.9996 
EET 0.0079 0.0486 0.9973 BRA 0.5612 8.4974 0.9997 
FSU 0.0023 0.0042 0.9938 ROW 0.0021 0.0805 0.9967 
Notice˖Derived from Ellerman & Decaux’s Analysis of Post-Kyoto CO2 Emissions Trading Using Marginal Abatement Curves.
3.2 Analysis on Model of the Starting Point of International Carbon Emission Right Trading 
Abatement cost functions vary for different countries or districts. According to Coase Theorem and 
Pareto Optimality, when transaction and transportation costs are not taken into consideration, the market 
achieves equilibrium with the minimum transaction cost (or the maximum profit). Then, there exists the 
possibility of international carbon emission right trading between Annex B countries and Non-Annex B 
countries, which is give detailed discussion below. 
Suppose there is a carbon emission right trading market composed of one buyer and one seller. Here 
the cases of CHN and EEC are taken as examples. CHN’s marginal abatement cost quadratic function is 
as follows: 
CCCCC QbQaMC +=
2                                 ˄1˅
CHN’s abatement cost function is obtained through integral calculus: 
23
2
1
3
1
CCCCC QbQaTC +=                               ˄2˅
Where CMC  represents CHN’S marginal abatement cost of carbon emission; Ca  and Cb  represent 
the quadratic term and first-order term coefficient of CHN’s marginal abatement cost of carbon emission 
function, respectively; CQ represents the abatement quantity in the trading, and CTC  represents the total 
cost of abatement. 
Similarly, the quadratic function of EEC’s marginal abatement cost is as follows: 
EEEEE QbQaMC +=
2
                                  ˄3˅
The abatement cost function is obtained through integral calculus: 
23
2
1a
3
1
EEEEE QbQTC +=                                ˄4˅
Where EMC  represents EEC’s marginal abatement cost of carbon emission; Ea & Eb  represent the 
quadratic term coefficient and first-order term coefficient of EEC’s marginal abatement cost of carbon 
emission ,respectively; EQ  represents the abatement quantity of EEC, and ETC  represents the total cost 
of EEC’s abatement. 
The abatement cost of EEC is higher than that of CHN. Due to the global emission equivalence of 
greenhouse gases such as CO2 and the guarantee of flexible carbon emission trading mechanism 
instituted by Tokyo Protocol, EEC has the right to purchase carbon emission right from CHN in order to 
achieve its own carbon abatement goal. Suppose  EEC’s quantity of abatement obligation prescribed in 
Tokyo Protocol is at least kEQ , and the quantity of carbon emission right that can be purchased 
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internationally is EBQ , with EBEKE QQQ +≤ . According to the above assumption that there is only 
one buyer and one seller, the quantity of CHN’s export emission right is EBQ .
After the transaction between CHN and EEX has started, the model of carbon emission right can be 
expressed as follows: 
¸
¹
·¨
©
§
+−= 23 b
2
1
3
1max CCCCEBCSC QQaQPTRC        s. t.    CEB QQ ≤            ˄5˅
EBEBEEEEE PQQbQTCE ++=
23
2
1a
3
1min         s. t.    EBEKE QQQ +≤        ˄6˅
Where ETCE  represents the total cost for EEC to fulfill its abatement goal through its own effect in 
abatement and the purchase of carbon emission right internationally; EBQ  represents the abatement 
quantity that EEC has purchased from CHN; EBP  represents the unit price at which EEC purchase 
emission right from CHN; CTRC  represents the total profits that CHN has gained by selling its carbon 
emission right, and EBP  represents the unit price at which CHN sells its carbon emission right. Without 
the consideration of transaction cost, etc., the market clearing can achieve the equality between EEC’S 
purchase price and CHN’s selling price, i.e. CSEB PP = .
3.3 Graphical Analysis on the Results of International Carbon Emission Right Trading 
According to Figure 1, Curves ER  and CR  denote the marginal abatement costs of EEC and CHN, 
respectively. Before the transaction, their respective marginal abatement costs are EP  and CP 0= ,
respectively, and apparently EP > CP . After the transaction, the marginal abatement costs of EEC and 
CHN, i.e. the market clearing price =eP CSEB PP = , and their respective abatement quantities are E
Q
and CQ , respectively. The quantity that EEC imports ( kEQ - EQ ) equals the quantity that CHN sells. 
EEC’s total cost of the fulfillment of the abatement goal is reduced from kEHOQ  to kEOMGQ  by 
importing carbon emission right. And the saved cost is the net earning denoted as MGH  in the 
transaction; in the case of CHN, the export earning is COQ eNP , from which the cost NOQC is
deducted to obtain the net earning eONP . It can be known from such analysis that both EEC and CHN 
can benefit themselves by way of carbon emission right trading, in which the former reduces its 
abatement cost, and the latter gains the export earning. In this way, a win-win situation occurs, and this is 
precisely the logic starting point for international carbon emission right market to form and develop. 
                                             
                                     
                                         
                    
                     
Figure 1ˊMarginal Abatement Curves 
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4. Analysis on Optimal Exports Scale of China’s Carbon Emission Right 
4.1 The calculation of Implicit Function of Optimal Exports Scale of International Carbon Emission 
Right  
Two-phase model is established to analyze the solving function of  Non-Annex B country’s optimal 
exports scale of carbon emission right, which doesn’t assume the abatement obligation in the first phase, 
but in the second phase.  
The assumed conditions of the two-phase model is listed as follows: (1) Suppose a country does not 
assume the abatement obligation in phase 1t , and the corresponding abatement quantity 1Q  can be 
converted into transferrable emission right, all of which are exported; (2) Suppose this specific country is 
obliged to reduce emission 2E  in phase 2t , in order to fulfill abatement goal,  and this country has to 
import the emission right mQ  in addition to achieve the abatement quantity 2Q ; (3) Suppose the 
country’s total quantity of carbon emission abatement is Q  in phase 1t  and 2t , and 21 QQQ += ; (4) 
Suppose the international carbon emission market is in perfect competition, then the transaction price is 
determined by the market; (5) The abatement cost function is  )( ttt QCC = ˄ 2,1=t ˈand the value 
of t is the same below ˅, and the marginal abatement cost function is )('' ttt QCCMC == , which is a 
strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable function with effective tQ ; (6)  The expenses arising 
from the transaction of carbon emission right are dismissed. 
By totaling up the net values’ present value of both phases, the following can be obtained: 
[ ]mQPQCQCQPnet ⋅−−+−⋅= 2221111 )()( δ                 ˄7˅
After the substitution of 12 QQQ −= ˈthe first-order derivative of 1Q  can be obtained˖
2
'
2
'
11
' PCCPnet ⋅−⋅+−= δδ
The second-order derivative of 1Q  is obtained as follows: ''2
''
1
'' CCnet ⋅−−= δ
If the function )('' ttt QCCMC ==  is strictly increasing with effective tQ , then 0
''
1 ;C ǃ 0''2 ;C .
Therefore, 0'' Enet  and net  are convex functions. When the first-order function 0' =net , the value 
of net  corresponding to the value of 1Q  reaches its maximum. 
When 0' =net , then 211
'
21
'
1 )()( PPQQCQC ⋅−=−⋅− δδ         
It is thus clear that if the marginal abatement cost function )( ttt QCC = , the prices of carbon emission 
right 1P  and 2P , the total emission quantity Q  and discount coefficient are already known, then the 
optimal abatement quantity *1Q  in phase 1t , i.e. the optimal exports scale of this phase can be solved.  
4.2 Calculation of Optimal Exports Scale of China’s Carbon Emission Right 
If China’s marginal abatement function, the total abatement quantity in both phases, the price of 
emission right, and discount coefficient are all known, then we can solve the value of the optimal export 
quantity *1Q  of China in phase according to Formula (8). Ellerman et al. mentioned above have obtained 
China’s marginal abatement function in 2010 as 1
2
1
'
1 0239.000007.0 QQC +=  with the assistance of 
EPPA regressive analysis, which could be viewed as the marginal abatement function of the first phase. 
Considering the comparable factors such as economic scale and emission quantity, it is preferable to 
replace the function above with 2
2
2
'
2 0398.00005.0 QQC += ,   the first phase abatement cost function of 
USA, which keeps a relatively low level of abatement cost. Shortly before the Copenhagen Conference, 
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China published its goal of reducing carbon dioxide emission for every unit of GDP by 40%-45% in 2020 
compared with 2005. Qilu Securities anticipated that in order to achieve this goal, the total quantity of 
carbon dioxide emission in China should be 6 to 7 billion tons in Series Report II on Environmental 
Conservation and Chemical Engineering Industry published on May 10th, 2010. In this paper, it is 
assumed that the total abatement quantity is 6.5 billion tons, i.e. MtonQ 6500= . Based on the existing 
researches of Shi Yadong (2010) et al, the values of 1P  & 2P  are set to be 16 dollars according to the 
quoted prices of CER and EUA and exchange rates of ECX Exchange, If 2025 is chosen in the calculation 
of the second phase, then the calculation period spans 15 years. Domestic discount coefficient δ  has a 
close relationship with bank interest rate. After obtaining the interest rate level between 1989 and 2010, 
after the weighted mean of annual interest rate is 5.13%m, and 472.0=δ .
Based on the above estimated statistics, the optimal exports scale of China’s first-phase carbon 
emission right is calculated as 2.855 billion tons, which may require further adjustment by taking into 
account of China’s abatement cost, the price of emission right market and the market interest etc. At 
present, this value can be used as the reference data during China’s international negotiation on carbon 
emission or in the cooperation in carbon emission with other developing countries. 
5. Conclusion 
The Annex B countries and Non-Annex B Countries differ in marginal abatement cost, and they can 
achieve win-win through the carbon emission right transaction. Developing countries should participate in 
the international carbon emission right transaction actively, so as to gain due market benefits by way of 
reasonable export of carbon emission right. Non-Annex B countries, which have no abatement obligation 
in the first phase, should take part in the international carbon emission right transaction in a rational way, 
and should not sell the carbon emission right—the public resource with IP(Property right) character—
cheaply. There exist several factors influencing the export quantity of carbon emission right of Non-
Annex B Countries in the first phase. China’s optimal exports scale of first-phase carbon emission right is 
estimated to be 2.855 billion tons. However, this figure needs to be further adjusted according to 
abatement cost, carbon emission right price, its own abatement capacity and discount rate etc.  
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